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The climate system is an angry beast and we are poking it with sticks.y
Abstract
A critical issue in climate-change economics is the speci￿cation of the so-called
￿damages function￿and its interaction with the unknown uncertainty of catastrophic
outcomes. This paper asks how much we might be misled by our economic assess-
ment of climate change when we employ a conventional quadratic damages function
and/or a thin-tailed probability distribution for extreme temperatures. The paper
gives some numerical examples of the indirect value of various GHG concentration
targets as insurance against catastrophic climate-change temperatures and damages.
These numerical examples suggest that we might be underestimating considerably the
welfare losses from uncertainty by using a quadratic damages function and/or a thin-
tailed temperature distribution. In these examples, the primary reason for keeping
GHG levels down is to insure against high-temperature catastrophic climate risks.
1 Introduction
An important question often asked about climate change is: How bad will it get? Catastrophic
climate-change damages are characterized by deep structural uncertainties in the science
combined with severe constraints on the ability to evaluate meaningfully the welfare losses
from high temperatures. The absolutely critical centerpiece of any credible economic analy-
sis of climate change has to be its extreme uncertainty. Values of key future variables ￿
temperatures, climate, comprehensive damages, overall welfare, and so forth ￿cannot be
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1known now. They must be conceptualized instead as random variables (RVs), yet to be
drawn from some probability density function (PDF). How bad will it get? An answer
must ultimately be expressed in the language of tail probabilities.
This paper concentrates on the appropriate way to represent uncertain global warming
and uncertain damages. The ￿damages function￿is a notoriously weak link in the economics
of climate change, because it is di¢ cult to specify a priori and because, as will be shown,
the results from a cost-bene￿t analysis (CBA) or an integrated assessment model (IAM)
can be quite sensitive to its speci￿cation at the upper end of extreme impacts. Another
notoriously weak link in the economics of climate change is the estimation of tail fatness
for the PDF of extreme warmings. These problems are especially acute at catastrophically
high temperatures, because huge uncertainties surround any estimates of extreme damages
or probabilities of climate-change disasters. Ideally, one wants analytically tractable forms
that capture adequately the economic reality of global warming. The existing literature
on CBAs and IAMs of climate change mostly concentrates on super-moderate quadratic
damages and on super-thin-tailed point-mass PDFs.1
This paper investigates what might happen to an economic analysis of climate change
with a signi￿cantly more reactive damages function than the quadratic and with PDFs having
tails of varying degrees of fatness. The paper attempts to give some extremely rough ballpark
estimates of the di⁄erences in steady-state temperature PDFs and damages as a function of
greenhouse gas (GHG) target concentration levels. These di⁄erences vary greatly according
to the speci￿cation, but on the whole they are substantial enough to suggest that in some
situations ￿especially when catastrophic damages interact with fat-tailed uncertainty ￿we
might be underestimating welfare losses considerably. The critical question here is: How fast
does the probability of a catastrophe decline relative to the welfare impact of the catastrophe?
Even tiny probabilities can be o⁄set by negative welfare impacts that are big enough. In
such conditions the fact that the tiny probabilities are themselves unknown is, other things
being equal, more troubling than if they were known precisely. With the examples being
considered in this paper, the primary reason for keeping target GHG levels down is to insure
against high-temperature catastrophic climate risks. In situations where fat-tailed PDFs
are combined with a reactive damages function, the welfare di⁄erences between various target
GHG levels are typically very large and there is a much stronger case for keeping down GHG
target levels than when tails are thin or damages are quadratic.
Climate change is so complicated, and it involves so many sides of so many di⁄erent disci-
plines and viewpoints, that no analytically-tractable model or paper can aspire to illuminate
1A striking exception is the important IAM-based study of extreme climate change by Dietz (2009), which
contains references to earlier work in this area.
2more than but a facet. Because the climate change problem is so complex, there is frequent
reliance on sophisticated numerical computer simulations. These can be indispensable, but
sometimes they do not provide a simple intuition for the processes they are modeling. In this
paper I go to the opposite extreme by focusing on relatively tractable comparative-steady-
state solutions. What I am presenting here is a kind of ￿stress test￿approach to grasping
intuitively the robustness of modeling highly uncertain extreme damages. This paper is
mostly about conceptualizing the problem of high-temperature catastrophic damages and
giving some rough sense of the magnitudes involved via particular numerical examples. It is
less about giving decisive numerical values for actual practical policy advice, although some
policy implications will be apparent. The beauty of this toy model approach is that the
formulas I will use are su¢ ciently simple and transparent that readers can easily plug in dif-
ferent speci￿cations or attach the model to other frameworks and make their own inferences.
A drawback of my toy model approach is that it might be missing some critical dynamic
interactions that are unable to be captured by the crudeness of what is largely an exercise
in comparative steady states. So any conclusions of this paper are at most suggestive and
may need to be modi￿ed in the light of performing detailed numerical simulations from more
complicated dynamic computer models. Still, I think there is an important role for baby
models such as this one, which give some direct intuition that may be considerably more
transparent than what emerges from detailed simulations of more complicated formulations.
2 Uncertain Equilibrium Warmings
There are so many sources of uncertainty in climate change that a person almost does not
know where or how to begin cataloging them. For speci￿city, I focus on the uncertainty
of so-called ￿equilibrium climate sensitivity.￿ This is a relatively well-de￿ned and relatively
well-studied example of known unknowns, even if the uncertainties themselves are uncertain.
However, it should be clearly understood that under the rubric of ￿equilibrium climate
sensitivity￿I am trying to aggregate together an entire suite of uncertainties, including some
non-negligible unknown unknowns. So climate sensitivity is to be understood here as a
prototype example or a metaphor, which is being used to illustrate much more generic issues
in the economics of highly uncertain climate change. The insights and results of this paper
are not intended to stand or fall on the narrow issue of accurately modeling uncertain climate
sensitivity per se. Whatever its source, greater uncertainty generally strengthens the case I
am trying to make in this paper.
The economics of climate change consists of a very long chain of tenuous inferences fraught
with big uncertainties in every link: beginning with unknown base-case GHG emissions; then
3compounded by big uncertainties about how available policies and policy levers will transfer
into actual GHG emissions; compounded by big uncertainties about how GHG ￿ ow emis-
sions accumulate via the carbon cycle into GHG stock concentrations; compounded by big
uncertainties about how and when GHG stock concentrations translate into global average
temperature changes; compounded by big uncertainties about how global average temper-
ature changes decompose into regional climate changes; compounded by big uncertainties
about how adaptations to, and mitigations of, climate-change damages are translated into
utility changes at a regional level via a ￿damages function￿ ; compounded by big uncertainties
about how future regional utility changes are aggregated into a worldwide utility function
and what should be its overall degree of risk aversion; compounded by big uncertainties about
what discount rate should be used to convert everything into expected-present-discounted
values. The result of this lengthy cascading of big uncertainties is a reduced form of truly
enormous uncertainty about the form of an integrated assessment problem whose structure
wants badly be transparently understood and stress tested for catastrophic outcomes.
Let welfare W stand for expected present discounted utility, whose theoretical upper
bound is B. Let D ￿ B ￿W be expected present discounted disutility. Here D stands for
what might be called the ￿diswelfare￿of climate change. Unless otherwise noted, my default
meaning of the term ￿fat tail￿(or ￿thin tail￿ ) will concern the upper tail of the PDF of lnD,
resulting from whatever combination of probabilistic temperature changes, temperature-
sensitive damages, discounting, and so forth, by which this comes about. Empirically, it is
not the fatness of the tail of temperature PDFs alone or the reactivity of the damages function
to high temperatures alone, or any other factor alone, that counts, but the combination of
all such factors. It may seem arcane, but the tail thickness of the reduced-form PDF of lnD
plays an essential role in the economics of catastrophic climate change. In this paper, the
default fatness that really matters concerns the bad tail of the reduced-form PDF of lnD ￿
not climate sensitivity per se. Of course it is extremely di¢ cult to know the thickness of
the upper tail of the PDF of lnD, which is my main thesis in this paper.
￿Equilibrium climate sensitivity￿(hereafter denoted S) is a key macro-indicator of the
eventual temperature response to GHG changes. It is de￿ned as the global average surface
warming that follows a sustained doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), after the
climate system has reached a new equilibrium.2 Calculating the actual time trajectory of
2In scienti￿c jargon, S is a so-called ￿fast equilibrium￿concept based on ￿fast feedbacks￿(geologically
speaking). The concept omits slower-acting feedbacks, such as changes in albedo, changes in biological sinks
or sources, temperature-induced releases of carbon from clathrates, and the like. So-called ￿earth system
sensitivity￿includes slower-acting feedbacks and is presumably larger, perhaps signi￿cantly so. For a time
horizon on the scale of 150 years or so, it is not implausible that ￿earth system sensitivity￿might be the
more relevant concept. Greater details are available, e.g., in Hansen et al (2008).
4temperatures is a complicated task that requires sophisticated computer modeling based on
general circulation models with hundreds of parameters and variables. The human mind
being what it is, however, there is a need to reduce and relate such a complicated dynamic
reality to an aggregate indicator, like S. This is a simplistic reduction that overlooks
important spatial and temporal aspects of climate change. Nevertheless, the concept is
still very useful for capturing the ￿big picture￿ ￿perhaps because the more complicated
simulation models ￿nd that several aspects of climate change seem to scale approximately
linearly with S.3 As just one example of an application of this convenient reductionism, the
GHG concentrations that would prevent so-called ￿dangerous anthropogenic interference￿
￿however it is de￿ned ￿are often made by back-of-the-envelope calculations based on S.
But because S is uncertain, the uncertain temperature changes induced by a given GHG
concentration can only be described in terms of probabilities. This paper follows very closely
the spirit and assumptions (and drawbacks) of the S-reductionist approach.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its IPCC-AR4 (2007) Executive
Summary explains S this way: ￿The equilibrium climate sensitivity is a measure of the
climate system response to sustained radiative forcing. It is not a projection but is de￿ned
as the global average surface warming following a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations.
It is likely to be in the range 2 to 4.5￿C with a best estimate of 3￿C, and is very unlikely
to be less than 1.5￿C. Values substantially higher than 4.5￿C cannot be excluded, but
agreement of models with observations is not as good for those values.￿ The IPCC de￿nes
￿likely￿as a probability above 66% but below 90%. In this paper I choose 70% as de￿ning
￿likely￿and I calibrate all upper-tail probability distributions so that P[S ￿3￿C]=50% and
P[S ￿4.5￿C]=15%.4
The upper-half tail of the probability distribution is the region S > SM, whose total
probability mass is .5, where the climate-sensitivity median is SM=3￿C. I use three PDFs
to represent this upper-half tail of climate sensitivity: (1) the Normal distribution, which
has a thin upper tail; (2) the Pareto (or Power) distribution, which has a fat upper tail; (3)
the Lognormal distribution which has an upper tail on the borderline between fat and thin.
There is some wiggle room in the de￿nition of what constitutes a fat-tailed PDF or a thin-
tailed PDF, but almost everyone agrees that probabilities declining exponentially or faster
(like the Normal) are thin tailed, while probabilities declining polynomially or slower (like
the Pareto) are fat tailed. The intermediate-tailed Lognormal is an interesting borderline
case because the probabilities in its upper tail decline slower than exponentially but faster
3See, e.g., Knutti and Hegerl (2008).
4I lean more toward P[S ￿4.5￿C]￿17% than toward P[S ￿4.5￿C]￿5% because, for a time horizon of a
century and a half or so, it is plausibly the more inclusive ￿earth system sensitivity￿that matters more than
the ￿fast equilibrium sensitivity￿that IPCC-AR4 refers to. See also footnote 1.
5than polynomially.5 For all three PDFs I calibrate parameters so that P[S ￿3]=.5 and
P[S ￿4.5]=.15. A major goal of this paper is to experiment with di⁄erent PDFs above the
median value of SM=3￿C. For the purposes of this paper, very little depends on the exact
form of the PDF for the 50% of probability below the median. By contrast, we are forced to
speculate and extrapolate wildly concerning the PDF for the 50% of probability above the
median, and, as we shall see, this can have major consequences.
The notation fI(S) refers to the PDF of climate sensitivity S. The subscript I=L refers
to a Lognormal PDF, the subscript I=N refers to a PDF whose upper-half tail is Normal,
and the subscript I=P refers to a distribution whose upper-half tail is Pareto (or Power).
I begin with the base case of the Lognormal, whose upper-half PDF here is
fL(S) =
1
:3912
p
2￿ S
exp
￿
￿
(lnS ￿ 1:099)2
2(:3912)2
￿
(1)
for all S ￿ 3. As can readily be con￿rmed, the parameter values in (1) have been calibrated
so that P[S ￿3￿C]=.5 and P[S ￿4.5￿C]=.15. I also consider two other possibilities for the
upper-half tail: a fat-tailed Pareto PDF and a thin-tailed Normal PDF.
My upper-half-tail Pareto PDF is also speci￿ed by its parameters being set so that simul-
taneously PP[S￿3]=.5 and PP[S￿4.5]=.15. It is readily con￿rmed that the corresponding
upper-half-tail Pareto PDF is
fP(S) = 38:76S
￿3:969: (2)
My upper-half-tail Normal PDF is again speci￿ed by its two parameters being set so
that simultaneously PN[S￿3]=.5 and PN[S￿4.5]=.15. It is readily con￿rmed that the cor-
responding upper-half-tail Normal PDF is
fN(S) =
1
1:447
p
2￿
exp
￿
￿
(S ￿ 3)2
2(1:447)2
￿
: (3)
The following table gives some values for the three cumulative distributions.
b S = 3￿C 4.5￿C 6￿C 8￿C 10￿C 12￿C 15￿C 20￿C
PP[S ￿ b S] .5 .15 .064 .027 .014 .008 .004 .002
PL[S ￿ b S] .5 .15 .038 .006 .001 2￿10￿4 2￿10￿5 6￿10￿7
PN[S ￿ b S] .5 .15 .019 .003 7￿10￿7 3￿10￿10 6￿10￿17 4￿10￿32
Table 1: P[S ￿ b S] for the three probability distributions used in this paper.
5The moment generating function of a Lognormal PDF is in￿nite, although every moment is ￿nite.
6I think that not many climate scientists would quibble about the ￿big picture￿of the
PDF of climate sensitivity given by Table 2 for low values of climate sensitivity. For what
it is worth, the median upper ￿ve percent probability level over all 22 climate-sensitivity
PDFs cited in IPCC-AR4 is 6.4￿C, which ￿ts with the Pareto PDF above.6 Notice that
the absolute probabilities of very high values of S are quite small. Even so, the relative
probabilities of high S are extremely dependent on whether the upper tail of the relevant
PDF is fat, thin, or intermediate.
It is tempting to say that climate sensitivity above, say, 15￿C is ￿impossible.￿ I would
prefer to think that anything is possible under the novel experiment of (geologically instanta-
neously) doubling atmospheric CO2 concentrations in a situation where so many unknowns
are so highly uncertain. Take the lognormal PDF as a base case. I am not sure how anyone
would distinguish operationally here between a very rare event S>15￿C that is ￿impossible￿
and a very rare event S>15￿C that, from Table 1, has a 1/50,000 chance of materializing.
Such ￿ne distinctions can be ignored in most applications, and the analysis can proceed as if
the event is ￿impossible￿for all practical purposes. But in the extraordinary case of global
warming, whose potential damages could engulf the entire planet, one does not have the
luxury of ignoring even the lowest of low-probability events if they occur with the highest of
highly-negative impacts.
The next step is to convert PDFs of equilibrium climate sensitivity S into PDFs of
equilibrium temperature change T, as a function of given stable greenhouse gas (GHG) target
concentrations. Let G stand for atmospheric GHGs as measured in parts per million (ppm)
of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). Climate sensitivity corresponds to the equilibrium
temperature change eventually induced by a sustained doubling of CO2e. Let ￿(G) represent
the ￿forcing factor￿as a function of the steady-state GHG level G, with ￿(G) normalized
by making ￿(560)￿1. An atmospheric concentration of G=560 ppm represents a doubling
of the pre-industrial-revolution level of G=280. As is well known, the forcing factor ￿
increases linearly in the logarithm of CO2e concentrations.7 With normalization ￿(560)￿1,
the precise formula is
￿(G) =
ln(G=280)
ln2
: (4)
Therefore, a given constant level of GHGs G and a given equilibrium climate sensitivity
S translates into a steady-state temperature change of
T = ￿(G) ￿ S: (5)
6Details in Weitzman (2009a).
7See, e.g., Archer (2007).
7If fI(S) is the relevant PDF of climate sensitivity, then the relevant PDF of temperatures
T for a given level of G is
 I(T j G) =
fI(T=￿(G))
￿(G)
: (6)
To anchor the upper tail of extreme warmings, I focus sharply on just two iconic (if
arbitrary) values of extraordinarily high global average temperature increases: 6￿C and
12￿C. Six degrees of extra warming is about the upper limit of what the human mind can
envision for how the state of the planet might change. It serves as a routine upper bound
in attempts to communicate what the most severe global warming might signify, including
the famous ￿burning embers￿diagram of the IPCC and several other popular expositions.8
One recent study9 asked 52 experts for their subjective probability estimates of triggering
a ￿tipping point of major changes￿ in each of ￿ve possible categories: (1) the Atlantic
meridional overturning circulation; (2) the Greenland ice sheet; (3) the West Antarctic Ice
Sheet; (4) the Amazon rainforest; (5) the El Niæo/Southern Oscillation. For what it is
worth, at an average temperature increase of T ￿6￿C the expected (probability weighted)
number of such expert-assessment tipping points was three (out of a possible ￿ve).
Twelve degrees of global warming is used here as an example of a round number (12￿C=2￿6￿C)
that transcends our ability to imagine, with any reasonable measure of accuracy, what the
earth might be like for super-high temperature increases. For me, 12￿C is especially iconic
because of a recent study, which estimated that global average temperature increases of
￿11-12￿C would cause conditions under which more than half of today￿ s human population
would be living in places where, at least once a year, there would be periods when death
from heat stress would likely ensue after about six hours of exposure.10 The authors of this
study furthermore point out: ￿This likely overestimates what could practically be tolerated:
our limit applies to a person out of the sun, in a gale-force wind, doused with water, wearing
no clothing and not working.￿ The massive unrest and uncontainable pressures this would
bring to bear on the world￿ s population are almost unimaginable. A temperature change
of ￿12￿C therefore represents an extreme threat to human civilization as we now know it,
even if it does not necessarily mean the end of Homo sapiens as a species.
Throughout the numerical examples that follow, I arbitrarily take 18￿C (3￿6￿C) to be
an upper bound beyond which temperatures are not allowed to go ￿by ￿at. Thus, for
all calculations of expected values, damages are capped at 18￿C and probabilities of such
damages are calculated as P[T ￿18￿C]. In this sense 18￿C might be envisioned as something
like a global ￿death temperature.￿
8See, e.g., IPCC-AR4 (2007) and Lynas (2007).
9Kriegler et al, (2009).
10Sherwood and Huber (2010).
8The issue of how to deal with the deep structural uncertainties in climate change would
be completely di⁄erent and immensely simpler if systemic inertias, like the time required
for the system to naturally remove extra atmospheric CO2, were short, as is the case for
many airborne pollutants like particulates, sulfur dioxide, and ozone. Then an important
component of an optimal strategy might be along the lines of ￿wait and see.￿ With strong
reversibility, an optimal climate-change policy should logically involve (among other ele-
ments) waiting to learn how far out on the bad fat tail the planet might end up, followed by
midcourse corrections if we seem to be headed for a disaster. Alas, the problem of climate
change seems bedeviled almost everywhere by signi￿cant stock-accumulation inertias ￿in
atmospheric CO2, in the absorption of heat or CO2 by the oceans, in the uptake of CO2
by the biosphere, in albedo changes, in the wildcard behavior of methane clathrates, and in
many other relevant physical and biological processes that are extremely slow to respond to
attempts at reversal.
Take atmospheric carbon dioxide as a prime example. Solomon et al (2009) calculated
how concentrations of CO2 would be expected to fall o⁄ over time if all anthropogenic
emissions were to cease immediately, following a future 2% annual growth rate of emissions
up to peak concentrations of 450, 550, 650, 750, 850 and 1,200 ppm. As the authors state:
￿The example of a sudden cessation of emissions provides an upper bound to how much
reversibility is possible, if, for example, unexpectedly damaging climate changes were to be
observed.￿ Results di⁄ered for di⁄erent trajectories and scenarios, but a crude rule of thumb
seemed to be that approximately 70% of the peak enhancement level over the preindustrial
level of 280 ppm persevered after 100 years of zero emissions, while approximately 40% of the
peak enhancement level over the preindustrial level of 280 ppm persevered after 1,000 years
of zero emissions. In the Solomon et al study, were atmospheric CO2 concentrations to peak
at 800 ppm, followed forever thereafter by zero emissions, then atmospheric concentrations
would be ￿650 ppm after 100 years and ￿500 ppm after 1,000 years. These numbers do
not look to me like evidence supporting ￿wait and see￿policies. The capacity of the oceans
to take up atmospheric heat, and many, many other relevant mechanisms, tell a similar story
of long stock-accumulation irreversibilities relative to the time it takes to ￿lter out and act
upon meaningful signals of impending disasters. Under such conditions of limited learning
relative to reversibility, the fact that the small probabilities of big disasters are themselves
uncertain is not an excuse for delay. Just the opposite, if anything it is a stronger call to
immediate action than if the probabilities were known precisely.
In the following Table 2, the ￿rst row represents steady-state atmospheric stocks of
greenhouse gas concentrations G (measured in ppm of CO2e). The second row below it
gives the median equilibrium temperature TM as a function of stabilized GHG stocks. The
9rows starting just below TM give the probabilities of achieving at least the steady state
temperature increase represented by the entries in the table (6￿C or 12￿C or 18￿C) for each
of the three chosen PDFs (Pareto=fat tail, Lognormal=intermediate tail, Normal=thin tail).
G : 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800 900 1000
TM : 1.5￿ 2.1￿ 2.5￿ 2.9￿ 3.3￿ 3.6￿ 4.0￿ 4.3￿ 4.5￿ 5.1￿ 5.5￿
PP[T ￿6] .9% 2% 4% 6% 8% 11% 15% 18% 22% 30% 39%
PL[T ￿6] 10￿4 .3% 1% 3% 6% 10% 14% 19% 24% 33% 41%
PN[T ￿6] 10￿9 10￿5 .2% 1% 4% 9% 14% 20% 25% 35% 43%
PP[T ￿12] .11% .26% .48% .75% 1.1% 1.5% 1.9% 2.3% 2.8% 3.8% 5.0%
PL[T ￿12] 10￿7 10￿6 10￿5 .02% .05% .12% .23% .41% .65% 1.4% 2.3%
PN[T ￿12] 10￿45 10￿24 10￿15 10￿10 10￿8 10￿6 10￿5 .08% .03% .22% .73%
PP[T ￿18] .03% .08% .14% .23% .32% .44% .56% .69% .84% 1.2% 1.5%
PL[T ￿18] 10￿10 10￿8 10￿7 10￿6 10￿5 10￿5 .01% .01% .02% .06% .12%
PN[T ￿18] 10￿108 10￿58 10￿37 10￿26 10￿20 10￿16 10￿13 10￿11 10￿10 10￿7 10￿6
Table 2: Probabilities of exceeding T=6
￿C, T=12
￿C, T=18
￿C, for given G = ppm of CO2e.
The thing that seems so striking about Table 2 is how relatively rapidly the probabilities
of high temperatures increase as a function of GHG concentrations ￿and how dependent
these high temperatures can be on the assumed fatness of the upper tail of the PDF of climate
sensitivity. Throughout Table 2, the target level of GHG concentrations in￿ uences strongly
the probabilities of high temperatures. One can readily see in shorthand form what are
the ultimate temperature consequences of moving from lower to higher steady-state GHG
concentrations. Of course these ultimate temperature consequences are expressible only
as probabilities. It can be quite misleading to look just at measures of central tendency,
like the median. What to me is far more alarming than the moderate rise of TM as a
function of G is what is happening in the upper reaches of the various PDFs, where the
really catastrophic outcomes are concentrated. The higher levels of GHGs seem especially
worrisome to me because they are pushing temperature probabilities towards the upper tail
at an uncomfortably rapid rate.
To see things most sharply, notice at the two opposite extremes that 400 ppm of G
here e⁄ectively blocks temperatures from rising much above 6￿C, whereas 1000 ppm of G
here assigns a probability of ￿41% to P[T ￿6￿C] and ￿1%-5% to P[T ￿12￿C], depending
10on the assumed tail fatness. Notice too how the di⁄erences between the three di⁄erent
PDFs (with three di⁄erent degrees of fatness in their tails) are manifested for various GHG
concentrations. Throughout most of Table 2 there is a disturbingly non-robust dependence of
outcomes on the presumed fatness of the upper tail of the PDF, which we simply cannot know.
The thin-tailed normal distribution e⁄ectively excludes the really hotter temperatures, while
the fat-tailed Pareto distribution presents a much more worrisome picture. This awkward
dependence upon presumed tail fatness is more pronounced the deeper one penetrates into
the extreme tail of the underlying PDF of climate sensitivity. At the higher concentrations
of GHGs, say ￿650 ppm of CO2e, a temperature increase of 6￿C is su¢ ciently close to the
middle-body range of all three climate-sensitivity PDFs that tail fatness per se does not
matter so much in determining P[T ￿6]. On the other hand, tail fatness always matters a
lot for determining P[T ￿12], even for higher GHG concentrations ￿650, because this part
of the range of temperatures is well into the extreme tail of the underlying climate-sensitivity
PDFs. In more colorful language, very di⁄erent tails may be appended to animals having
roughly similar bodies.
Table 2 suggests that the primary purpose of keeping down G may be to prevent possi-
bilities of extreme warmings in the upper range of the PDFs, and perhaps only secondarily
to keep down the median temperature (although this may be important too). In this sense
Table 2 is indicating indirectly how much ￿insurance￿society is willing to buy to ward o⁄the
risk of very high temperatures by paying the ￿cost￿of keeping GHG concentrations below
various levels. I do not analyze explicitly the costs of achieving various steady-state GHG
targets, being content to let them stand for themselves as proxies for less or more active mit-
igation measures. Only the ￿value￿or demand side of insurance (against high-temperature
extreme damages) is being presented (and that indirectly), not its ￿cost￿or supply side.
Throughout this paper, target steady-state GHG concentrations are interpreted as an im-
perfect proxy for ￿policy.￿
If one wants a transparent summary of the temperature consequences of higher GHG
concentrations, I think that Table 2 is ￿ne. Perhaps the analysis should be ended here, as
the table speaks for itself quite eloquently in ways that an informed citizen might understand
once the possible consequences of the ￿iconic￿values T=6￿C and T=12￿C have been sketched
out, as they were previously. But an economist is tempted to take the analysis at least one
step further toward quantifying damages before succumbing to a computer simulation of a
full-blown dynamic IAM with lots of opaque moving parts.
For any given G, and for any given PDF of S, we have derived a PDF of T (via (4)
and (6)), some numerical values of which are displayed in Table 2. Of course such type of
analysis ignores all kinds of dynamics to concentrate on the more easily understandable long
11run value of T associated with a sustained stationary level of G. In the coming extension
to potential damages, I will follow closely the spirit and assumptions of the approach to
temperature PDFs of this section. Thus, throughout this paper the simplistic methodol-
ogy looks primarily at the ￿big picture￿of a still photograph of damages in a steady state,
with only the most primitive story (later) about dynamics. I do not investigate seri-
ously the important subject of the motion picture describing the dynamics of getting to the
steady state. I only open the comparative-steady-state envelope a bit further to let in the
sticky subject of high-temperature damages. There is an arti￿cial timing here that com-
presses dynamics into statics by dealing primarily with steady states. Such an aggregate
comparative-steady-state approach has proved to be a useful shortcut way for organizing
thinking about eventual temperature responses to target GHG concentrations. It tells us in
shorthand form what temperatures (more accurately temperature PDFs) we are eventually
buying into when we set target GHG concentrations at various levels. I propose extending
the same strategy a little further to at least discuss the possible present discounted damages
from large temperature changes.
3 Uncertain Damages From Climate Change
From the very outset, the representation of damages from climate change presents some
severe conceptual and practical problems. I follow most of the literature by postulating
that damages from increased temperatures are manifested in reduced form as if they impair
output.11 In my version of this just-so story, all losses from climate change will be inter-
preted as if they literally translate into a welfare-equivalent loss of consumption. There
are some genuine doubts about what it means operationally to separate welfare-equivalent
consumption from welfare, but here I largely follow the existing literature. As mentioned,
this paper examines only the damages side, and that very simplistically. I do not try to
explicitly estimate costs of achieving various GHG targets, much less attempt to determine
an optimal policy by explicitly balancing the costs of achieving a given GHG target against
its bene￿ts.
Even granted that it multiplicatively diminishes consumption, no one knows how to
specify a ￿damages function￿ for high temperature changes. The predominant approach
attempts to calculate what the world would be like for a given small increase in global average
temperatures. The climate-change economist tries to quantify such things as net damages
(after subtracting out adaptation costs) from changes in: agricultural productivity, life styles,
population movements, rising oceans, hurricanes, and so forth. This is a constructive
11This interpretation could be challenged. See Weitzman (2009b).
12approach that probably represents the best we can do for small temperature changes. But I
am uneasy when this approach is extended to large changes in global average temperatures.
Taking the most extreme example I can imagine for making my point, suppose for the sake
of argument that average global warming were to increase by the extraordinary amount of
12￿C (with an extraordinarily low probability, of course). It is true that people live very well
in places where the average temperature is 12￿C higher than in Yakutsk, Siberia. However,
I do not think that these kinds of analogies can justify using such a comparative geography
approach for estimating welfare-equivalent damages from an average planetary temperature
change of 12￿C. There is just too much structural uncertainty to put meaningful bounds
on the unprecedented almost-unimaginable changes to planetary welfare from average global
temperatures increasing by 12￿C. I don￿ t think anyone knows how to evaluate the welfare-
equivalent ￿damages￿ from super-high average global temperatures, but global warming
of ￿12￿C has a good chance of going far beyond an absolute heat-stress limit that could
extinguish many mammals on earth and impair very severely human functioning.12
Let T represent the change in future worldwide average surface temperature, always
measured in degrees Centigrade. Let e C(T) represent ￿welfare equivalent￿consumption as a
fraction of what potential consumption would be (at that time when the RV T materializes)
in the absence of any climate change. (This concept itself has some problematical aspects,
which are ignored here, although my intention is that such intangibles as loss of the envi-
ronment as we know it are somehow included in ￿welfare equivalent￿consumption.) The
most popular single formulation of a damages function in the literature is the quadratic form
e CQ(T) = 1=
￿
1 + (T=￿)
2￿
, where ￿ is a positive temperature-scaling parameter calibrated to
give some ￿reasonable￿values of e CQ(T) for relatively small warmings, say up to T ￿2.5￿C.
Standard estimates of ￿ in the literature are more or less similar, although I hasten to add
that such calibrations were intended by the authors to capture low-temperature damages
and were never intended to be extrapolated to very high temperature changes, which is just
what I will be doing here. For the sake of having a speci￿c prototype example, I calibrate
￿ in (7) to conform with the damages function in the latest version of the well known
DICE model of William Nordhaus (2008), where he e⁄ectively used ￿=20.46.13 In this case,
12This is my own very loose translation of the study of Sherwood and Huber (2010).
13Nordhaus￿ s DICE model is perhaps the most famous integrated assessment model (IAM) in the economics
of climate change. The quadratic coe¢ cient 1=￿2 = :00239 was used to generate his Figure 3-3 on page 51.
Nordhaus wisely does not try to project beyond T = 6￿, which is suitable for his purposes but unsatisfactory
for mine.
13welfare equivalent consumption is given by the formula
e CQ(T) =
1
1 +
￿
T
20:46
￿2; (7)
where the natural scaling factor for T is the rather large value ￿=20.46￿C.
The results in terms of welfare-equivalent relative consumption levels for this quadratic
case are given by e CQ in the second row of Table 3. (The third-row variable e CR will be
discussed presently.)
T 2￿C 3￿C 4￿C 5￿C 6￿C 7￿C 8￿C 9￿C 10￿C 12￿C 15￿C 18￿C
e CQ 99% 98% 96% 94% 92% 90% 87% 84% 81% 74% 65% 56%
e CR 99% 97% 91% 75% 50% 27% 13% 7% 3% 1% .2% .1%
Table 3: Welfare-equivalent consumption e CQ(T) and e CR(T).
I do not ￿nd such numbers as e CQ(T) in Table 3 at all convincing for high temperatures.
At the mind-bending average global temperature change of T=18￿C, the welfare-equivalent
damage as a fraction of consumption at that time (when T=18￿C materializes) is ￿only￿
44%. The implied welfare-equivalent consumption damages of 35% for T=15￿ and 19% for
T=10￿ also seem to me to be far too low for doing a credible analysis of the consequences
of catastrophic losses from extreme climate change. My tentative conclusion is that the
quadratic form (7), which was never intended to be applied for temperature changes beyond
a few degrees centigrade, is not appropriate for assessing the welfare impacts of disastrously
high temperature changes. The quadratic ￿welfare equivalent￿damages function (expressed
as a fraction of what potential consumption would be if T=0), which is enumerated as e CQ in
the second row of Table 3, is pre-ordained to make extreme climate change look empirically
negligible almost no matter what else is assumed.
Of course I have no objective way to determine magnitudes of high-temperature damages,
but the last time that the world experienced episodes where global average temperatures
were very roughly ￿10￿C or so above the present was during the Eocene epoch ￿55-34 mya.
During these warming periods the earth was ice free while palm trees and alligators lived
near the North Pole. The Eocene was also the last epoch in which there were geologically
rapid increases in mean global temperatures of magnitude very roughly ￿5￿C or so above
an already warm background. Such hyperthermal events occurred over an average period of
very roughly ￿100K years or so, which is extremely gradual compared with current worst-
case anthropogenically-induced trajectories. It is unknown what exactly triggered these
temperature spikes, but they were accompanied by CO2 spikes. One leading culprit is
14the strong-feedback release of large amounts of methane hydrates from clathrate deposits,
which is a non-negligible possibility over the next century or two if current emissions trends
are extrapolated.14 The major point here is that relatively rapid changes of global average
temperatures ￿5￿C above present values are extremely rare events extraordinarily far outside
the scope of human experience. As for huge temperature increases like T ￿12￿, the planetary
e⁄ects are di¢ cult to imagine. To ￿nd a geologically instantaneous increase in temperatures
of magnitude T ￿12￿, one would perhaps have to go back hundreds of millions of years.
Others are free to calibrate any welfare-equivalent consumption loss they want in the range
above T ￿4￿, as anybody￿ s guess here is as good as mine. I don￿ t think that a person needs
accurate speci￿c stories about what might happen for T>12￿ to imagine truly upending
catastrophes undoing the planet and severely undermining the security of human civilization
￿at least.
I now want to ￿give the devil his due￿by characterizing very roughly two points on a
much more reactive damages function, which seems to me more plausible than the quadratic
and which attributes far bigger welfare-equivalent damages to higher temperatures. Of
course no one knows how to estimate welfare-equivalent damages for very high temperature
changes. I anchor my ￿give the devil his due￿damages function on two iconic (if arbitrary)
global-average temperature changes: 6￿C and 12￿C. What these two iconic global warmings
might mean for the human condition and for the rest of the planet has already been sketched
out. At 6￿C I propose welfare-equivalent consumption of e CR(6￿C)=50% (at that time), while
for 12￿C I propose welfare-equivalent consumption of e CR(12￿C)=1%.
Some IAMs and CBAs recommend a ￿climate policy ramp￿gradualism that would ap-
proach atmospheric CO2 levels of ￿700 ppm, which would arguably make GHG CO2e levels
be ￿750 ppm. From Table 2, GHG concentrations of 750 ppm would eventually result
in temperature increases ￿6￿C with probability ￿19% and temperature increases ￿12￿C
with average probability ￿1% (depending very much on how fat-tailed is the relevant PDF).
Using the proposed reactive speci￿cation of damages (e CR(6￿C)=50% and e CR(12￿C)=1%), I
calculated for the lognormal PDF that at G=750 ppm of CO2e there is ￿19% chance of dam-
ages greater than 50% and ￿1% chance of damages greater than 99%. With the quadratic
damages function (7) shown in Table 3, at G=750 ppm I calculated for the lognormal PDF
that the probability of damages ￿50% is ￿0.1%, while the probability of damages ￿99% is
￿10￿8. With these kinds of numbers, it is no wonder that a quadratic damages function is
fearless about attaining CO2e concentrations of 750 ppm ￿or even much higher!
The third row of Table 3 adds a term to the denominator of (7) making it have the
polynomial form e CQ(T) = 1=
￿
1 + (T=￿)
2 + (T=￿)
￿￿
, where (as before) ￿=20.46￿C, while I
14For more about methane clathrates, see Archer (2007) or the recent article by Shakova et al (2010).
15calibrated the temperature-scaling factor ￿ and the exponent ￿ so that e CR(6￿C)=50% and
e CR(12￿C)=1%. The relevant parameter values are ￿=6.081 and ￿=6.754. For this case,
in place of the ￿non-reactive￿ (7) we have instead a ￿reactive￿damages function of form
e CR(T) =
1
1 +
￿
T
20:46
￿2 +
￿
T
6:081
￿6:754: (8)
The two T-dependent terms in the denominator of (8) have equal impact for a tempera-
ture change of 3.65￿C. Notice, however, that when temperature changes having a scaling
factor of 6.081￿C are exponentiated to such a high power as 6.754 in (8), the consequence is
something like a tipping point where the damages function changes dramatically beginning
around the ￿iconic￿global warming of 6￿C. It is readily con￿rmed from Table 3 that e CR(T)
is indeed more ￿reactive￿to higher temperature changes than e CQ(T). As mentioned, global
average temperatures are arbitrarily forbidden from going above T=18￿C, which corresponds
in Table 3 to e CR(18￿C)=0.1%.
4 Welfare E⁄ects of Uncertain Climate Change
From equation (5), steady-state global warmings T (given steady-state GHG levels G), are
equal to the forcing function ￿(G) (de￿ned by expression (4)) times climate sensitivity S.
Since S is a RV with some postulated PDF, then (for any given G) T is a RV with PDF
given by (6). And then, given some postulated damages function of temperature (namely
e CQ(T) or e CR(T)), welfare-equivalent consumption in that steady state is itself a RV. I now
manufacture an arti￿cial example of welfare impacts by linking the uncertain-temperature
methodology of Section 2 with the damages functions of Section 3.
Suppose a constant relative risk aversion utility function (of consumption) having the
form
U(C) =
C1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
; (9)
where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. With r being the interest rate, ￿ being
the rate of pure time preference (or ￿utility discount rate￿ ), and g being the growth rate of
per-capita consumption, the fundamental Ramsey equation is
r = ￿ + ￿g: (10)
Following what Ramsey originally proposed, I take the rate of pure time preference (or
the so-called ￿utility discount rate￿ ) throughout this paper to be zero (i.e., ￿=0 in (10)). As
16Ramsey famously put the issue, ￿it is assumed that we do not discount later enjoyments in
comparison with earlier ones, a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from
the weakness of the imagination.￿ Several other (but far from all) famous economists concur
with this Ramsey interpretation of intergenerational equity.15 Taken together, quotations
from these ￿famous economists￿sound to me much more like a normative judgement about
intergenerational ethics than a description of short-run individual behavior. I think that
the Ramsey case of zero discounting of future utilities is the appropriate abstraction for a
normative analysis of climate change. Ethically or morally, the Ramsey abstraction treats
the utility of di⁄erent generations equally, while taking full account of the fact that economic
growth will make future generations richer and less needy than the present generation. My
base-case CRRA coe¢ cient is ￿=3, which corresponds to an eminently plausible degree of
risk aversion that I believe is close to the best estimate of most economists. My base-case
future growth rate of per capita consumption is g=2% per year.16 These base-case values
imply an interest rate of r=6% per year, and therefore the numerical results to follow cannot
in any way be ascribed to assuming an unrealistically low discount rate.
Were ￿ to be changed substantially, then r and g would not mesh quite so nicely with
past reality. If ￿=2 and r=6%, then (10) with ￿=0 implies g=3% ￿probably too high. If
￿=4 and g=2%, then (10) with ￿=0 implies r=8%, also probably too high. So I think it
is fair to say that this proposed ￿package￿of base-case point-estimate values (￿=0, r=6%,
￿=3, g=2%) looks more or less realistic, is internally consistent, and is immune from the
criticism that discounting of climate change is being marginalized.
For my base case I use the lognormal PDF of S (with its intermediate tail fatness), as
given by (1). I assume a particularly simplistic time scenario. Let G be the GHG target.
For the next ￿ years, consumption grows at annual rate g=2% and GHG levels build up
to (and stay at) G. My base case is ￿=150 years. Then, suddenly, at time ￿=150 years
from now, consumption is reduced by a fraction corresponding to the realization of T (given
G), and the assumed damages function (namely e CQ or e CR). After this permanent shock
to the level of consumption 150 years in the future, growth continues thereafter at annual
rate g=2%. In other words, there are no damages whatsoever until time ￿=150 years from
now, when the sky is allowed to fall all at once. The growth rate is never impacted, either
15Pigou: [pure time preference] ￿implies ... our telescopic faculty is defective.￿ Harrod: ￿pure time
preference [is] a polite expression for rapacity and the conquest of reason by passion.￿ Koopmans: ￿[I have]
an ethical preference for neutrality as between the welfare of di⁄erent generations.￿ Solow: ￿in solemn
conclave assembled, so to speak, we ought to act as if the social rate of pure time preference were zero.￿
(All quotes are taken from Arrow (1999).) I think it should be clear that the above citations refer to a
normative or prescriptive, rather than a positive or descriptive, view of the world.
16These values of ￿=3 and g=2% per year are close to those that were proposed by Dasgupta (2008), and
were considered fully acceptable by Nordhaus (2008, pp. 61 and 187).
17before or after the output shock at ￿=150. This is a primitive formulation, but I think it is
good enough to make the point that a reactive damages function and a tail of intermediate
fatness su¢ ce to dominate the e⁄ects of discounting, even at the very high interest rate of
r=6% and with climate changes occurring a century and a half from now. At an interest
rate of 6%, the relevant discount factor for goods and services a century and a half hence is
exp(￿:06 ￿ 150) = exp(￿9) = 0:01%, which is a very, very low number.
Without loss of generality, present consumption at time t=0 is normalized at C(0)=1.
Let b C represent the deterministic-equivalent value of C(0) that would give the same welfare
relative to there being zero climate change. Then b C is the implicit solution of the equation
Z 1
0
U(b C exp(:02t))dt =
Z 150
0
U(exp(:02t))dt + E
￿Z 1
150
U(e CJ exp(:02t))dt
￿
; (11)
where E[￿] is the expected-value operator and J=Q or J=R.
Now substitute the lognormal PDF (1), (6) (for I=L), the utility function (9) (for base
case ￿=3), and the damages functions (7) and (8) into equation (11). Solving for b C then
yields
b CJ =
￿
1 ￿ e
￿6 + e
￿6E
￿￿
e CJ
￿￿2￿￿￿:5
; (12)
where J=Q or J=R. The following table gives rounded-o⁄ values of b CQ and b CR as a
function of G.
G: 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800 900 1000
b CQ 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
b CR 100% 99.95% 99.4% 97.6% 92.4% 82.7% 70.2% 57.9% 47.2% 32.7% 24.0%
Table 4 Certainty-equivalent consumption for base-case lognormal PDF, ￿=3, T=18.
With the quadratic damages function (7), there is essentially the same welfare-equivalent
consumption level of ￿100% independent of GHG concentrations G. This is because the
expected present discounted welfare impact of quadratic damages incurred a century and
a half from now, evaluated at an interest rate of r=6%, is essentially zero. Thus, with
a standard quadratic damages function, in this formulation GHG concentrations of 1000
ppm of CO2e are essentially no worse than GHG concentrations of 400 ppm of CO2e when
discounted at rate r=6% per year. There is only a miniscule willingness to pay (WTP) now
to avoid signi￿cantly higher GHG concentrations a century and a half from now. No wonder,
18then, that optimal IAM trajectories derived from a quadratic damages function encourage
gradualist climate policy ramp CO2e levels approaching 750 ppm!
The welfare-equivalent certainty-equivalent ￿as if￿ consumption levels b CR enumerated
in Table 4 are each expressed relative to an arti￿cial norm of G=280 ppm, T=0. In other
words these numbers represent the WTP, in terms of certainty-equivalent consumption now
and forever, to eliminate all climate change. The various ￿as if￿consumption levels b CR
(as a function of steady-state G) are di¢ cult to interpret in absolute terms, and should be
compared with each other as fractions or multiples. For example, the welfare-equivalent
fractional loss of as-if-deterministic consumption accompanying a change in GHG concentra-
tions from 550 ppm to 750 ppm by Table 4 is (:976￿:579)=:976 = :407 ￿i.e., keeping target
GHG levels at 550 ppm rather than letting them rise to 750 ppm is worth spending up to
40.7% of present certainty-equivalent consumption at G=550. Or, to take another exam-
ple, the welfare-equivalent fractional loss of as-if-deterministic consumption accompanying a
change in GHG concentrations from 600 ppm to 650 ppm in Table 4 is (:924 ￿:827)=:924 =
:105. In other words, a modest coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of 3 is big enough to
make it worth spending 10.5% of consumption, now and forever, to avoid the higher (but
still very small) probabilities of bad warmings 150 years from now (which are indicated in
Table 2) by keeping target GHG levels at 600 ppm rather than letting them rise to 650 ppm.
Notice that the WTP to keep GHG concentrations below ￿500 ppm of CO2e are very
small because such low concentrations e⁄ectively wall o⁄ the higher temperature changes ￿
and discounting moderate events happening 150 years from now at an e⁄ective interest rate
of 6% (or an e⁄ective discount factor of 0.01%) takes care of the lower temperature changes.
Above ￿550 ppm of CO2e, however, the danger of higher temperatures accelerates greatly
the WTP now in order to avoid bad climate change outcomes a century and a half from now,
overriding even a discount rate of 6% per year. Such high WTP levels are testimony to the
power of combining risk aversion with fat tails and a reactive damages function. At greater
and greater GHG concentrations, risk aversion to the possibility of taking a catastrophic
￿hit￿ to consumption becomes more and more the dominant force in WTP calculations.
Again, the impression is that GHG policy is most accurately viewed as an insurance policy
against disastrous outcomes.
I now mention brie￿ y a few results from some primitive sensitivity experiments. In
order to compress these results, I report them only for 750 ppm of CO2e. I pick 750 ppm of
CO2e for two reasons. First, 750 ppm of CO2e is an upper limit on optimal GHG concentra-
tions that is approached by some optimizing IAMs and CBAs. Second, under non-optimal
business-as-usual scenarios, concentrations of 750 ppm of CO2e are all too conceivable as
early as the end of this century.
19Generally speaking, outcomes are very dependent on how extreme tail damages and
extreme tail probabilities are formulated. Results are not robust to how catastrophic out-
comes are modeled and speci￿ed. In this sense, the main robust ￿nding of the paper is
non-robustness to stress tests.
As was already shown, the standard quadratic damages function never produces a signif-
icant enough welfare impact to matter very much in determining policy. The very ￿rst form
of non-robustness to report on, therefore, is the sensitivity of results to the form of the dam-
ages function, already discussed previously in the paper. The ￿devil￿ s advocate￿reactive
damages function paints a very di⁄erent picture in Table 4 than the standard non-reactive
quadratic damages function.
I next examine what happens for di⁄erent values of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
(still keeping ￿=0 in the background ￿more on this later). From Table 4, welfare-equivalent
consumption for ￿=3 is 58%. For ￿=4, welfare-equivalent consumption at 750 ppm is 22%.
For ￿=2, welfare-equivalent consumption at 750 ppm is 88%. So quantitative values of the
WTP to avoid a GHG concentration of 750 ppm vary widely with the assumed degree of
risk aversion, and so too do corresponding policy recommendations. What is extremely
interesting here is the strong reversal of the traditional role of ￿. Through the Ramsey
formula, a higher value of ￿ is traditionally associated with a higher value of the discount
rate (here r = ￿g), for any given growth rate of consumption g. This higher value of ￿
then translates into a lower weighting for distant-future events, like climate change. As
an example, with an annual growth rate g=2%, the relevant discount factor for converting
bene￿ts a century and a half from now into today￿ s currency for ￿=4 is exp(-.02￿150￿4)=
6.1￿10￿6; for ￿=3 it is exp(-.02￿150￿3)=1.2￿10￿4; and for ￿=2 it is exp(-.02￿150￿2)=
2.5￿10￿3. This is a very wide range for discount factors, although all of these numbers are
extremely low. However, higher values of ￿ also indicate higher relative risk aversion, which
can easily have an even more powerful e⁄ect in the opposite direction for a reactive damages
function combined with a semi-fat upper tail of the temperature-change PDF. Thus, the
damages function (8) combined with even an intermediate-fatness tail like the lognormal is
easily su¢ cient to reverse strongly the traditional role of ￿, because the e⁄ect of aversion to
catastrophic uncertainty here easily outweighs the e⁄ect of time discounting.
If the Pareto fat-upper-tail PDF (2) is substituted for the lognormal (1) in the range
of climate sensitivity above the median SM=3, then welfare-equivalent consumption at 750
ppm is 27% instead of 58% in Table 4. If the normal thin-upper-tail PDF (3) is substituted
for the lognormal (1) above the median SM=3, then welfare-equivalent consumption at 750
ppm is 81% instead of 58% in Table 4. The WTP to avoid the uncertain consequences of a
GHG concentration of 750 ppm of CO2e is thus highly dependent on the assumed fatness of
20the upper tail of the PDF of climate sensitivity.
In Table 4, I assumed that global warming arrives at ￿=150 years from now. If the time
of arrival for global warming is ￿=200 years from now, then welfare-equivalent consumption
at 750 ppm is 89% instead of 58% in Table 4. If the time of arrival for global warming is
￿=100 years from now, then welfare-equivalent consumption at 750 ppm is 25% instead of
58% in Table 4.
For the base case enumerated in Table 4, I projected an annual growth rate of consump-
tion g=2%. If the annual growth rate of consumption is instead g=1%, then welfare-
equivalent consumption at 750 ppm is 16%, instead of 58% in Table 4. If the annual growth
rate of consumption is instead g=3%, then welfare-equivalent consumption at 750 ppm is
95%, instead of 58% in Table 4.
Finally, I examine the arti￿cially imposed upper bound cuto⁄ T, beyond which global
average temperatures are arbitrarily not allowed to go. In Table 4, I assumed an upper-
bound temperature cuto⁄ of T=18￿C. If the upper-bound temperature cuto⁄ is arbitrarily
made 6￿ higher, so that T=24￿C, then welfare-equivalent consumption at 750 ppm is 38%
instead of 58% in Table 4. If the upper-bound temperature cuto⁄ is arti￿cially made 6￿
lower, so that T=12￿C, then welfare-equivalent consumption at 750 ppm is 91% instead of
58% in Table 4.
In the following Table 5, I summarize brie￿ y the results of the above sensitivity experi-
ments.
case CRRA ￿ PDF impact yr ￿ growth g temp bd T welfare
base 3)58% L )58% 150)58% 2%)58% 18￿ )58% b CR )58%
alt1 2)88% N )81% 200)89% 3%)95% 12￿ )91% b CQ )100%
alt2 4)22% P )27% 100)25% 1%)16% 24￿ )38% n.a.
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis giving b CR for G=750 ppm.
Readers can form their own judgements, but for me Table 5 seems to be indicating a
disturbing lack of robustness with respect to parameter values that are extremely di¢ cult
to know with any degree of accuracy. Many researchers promote alternative speci￿cations
that do not imply nearly such extreme outcomes as do some of my speci￿cations. I do not
claim that their formulations are wrong or even implausible. I merely point out that they
are unlikely to be robust with respect to assumptions about extreme catastrophic climate
change under uncertainty, and therefore they fail a reasonable stress test.17
17The study of Costello et al (2010) uses exp(￿(T=￿)
2) in place of 1=(1+(T=￿)
2). With ￿=20.46, there
21To test parametric sensitivity with respect to the rate of pure time preference ￿, consider
the base case (￿=1.5%, ￿=2, g ￿2%) in Nordhaus (2008), which from (10) corresponds to
a discount rate r ￿5.5% per year. When Nordhaus runs instead through his DICE model
￿my￿base case (￿ ￿0, ￿=3, g ￿2%), which implies r=6% per year, there is no substantive
di⁄erence in outcomes.18 However, DICE is (essentially) a deterministic formulation in
the spirit of an optimal control problem featuring a relatively non-reactive quadratic loss
function. When lognormal uncertainty of form (1) is introduced, then there is a tremendous
di⁄erence between the two base cases. With quadratic losses (7), as usual b CQ ￿100%.
Even with my reactive damages function (8), if I plug the Nordhaus base-case speci￿cation
(￿=1.5%, ￿=2, g=2%) into my model I get b CR ￿99% for G=750 ppm of CO2e. In other
words, the WTP now to avoid altogether the consequences of G=750 at future time ￿=150
goes from ￿42% to ￿1% for two speci￿cations that would otherwise have near-identical
consequences in a deterministic world. The reason for such a dramatic di⁄erence is that
when pure time discounting is as high as ￿=1.5% per year, the risk aversion e⁄ect is overcome
by the discounting e⁄ect. Once again, readers can form their own judgements about the
implied robustness of policy implications under stress-test uncertainty ￿here with respect
to various values of ￿ and ￿.
5 Discussion
I think that several themes emerge from this paper.
The paper suggests that economic analysis of climate change might be very sensitive to
uncertainties about such things as the fatness of PDF tails for temperature changes, the
speci￿cation of the damages function, cuto⁄ bounds, relative risk aversion, rates of pure
time preference, growth rates, concentrations of greenhouse gases, and so forth. When
relatively fat-tailed PDFs are combined with a reactive damages function, then seemingly
modest changes in target levels of GHGs can sometimes have very big welfare consequences.
In such conditions, the primary purpose of keeping down GHGs is to prevent large damages
from extreme warmings in the ￿bad￿tail, which is a much more powerful incentive to tar-
get low GHG levels than trying to keep down the relatively modest damages from median
temperatures. But the exact quantitative extent to which changes in target levels of GHGs
can cause these very big welfare consequences depends sensitively on how the extremes are
modeled and speci￿ed. While conclusions from some plausible formulations seem relatively
is hardly any di⁄erence in implied damages, even for temperature changes as high as 18￿C. My tentative
conclusion is that their model, which uses the form exp(￿(T=￿)
2), is equally non-robust to the stress-test
numerical exercises of this paper, which uses the form 1=(1 + (T=￿)
2).
18This is essentially ￿Run 3￿reported on page 187 of Nordhaus (2008).
22immune to being represented by a measure of central tendency like the median, conclusions
from some other formulations, which appear equally if not more plausible to me, are extra-
ordinarily far from being captured by median values and seem to be highly dependent on
a variety of underlying uncertainties. Thus, we might be in an unfortunate position where
results from an economic analysis of climate change have a wide range of possible policy
recommendations, which depend upon barely knowable assumptions well beyond the realm
of ordinary experience. While I do not think that this feature nulli￿es CBAs or IAMs,
I do think it should make us especially cautious about the ability of economic analysis to
give robust policy advice for the speci￿c application of such methods to catastrophic climate
change. The moral of the story may be that, under extreme tail uncertainty, seemingly ca-
sual decisions about functional forms and parameter values for catastrophic outcomes might
well dominate CBA of climate change.
Another suggestion coming out of the paper is that the standard quadratic damages func-
tion simply cannot register, and therefore will not react to, the possibility of catastrophic
climate change. Once the usual quadratic damages speci￿cation is made, an optimal policy
will not get alarmed by high values of GHG concentrations, and almost inevitably it will
recommend relatively mild mitigation measures. The climate policy ramp gradualism that
emerges from many IAMs may be rooted in the fact that, even when uncertainty is intro-
duced in the form of Monte Carlo simulations, the usual quadratic damages function never
really allows the model to get very far away from e⁄ectively plugging median values into a
deterministic climate-change CBA and then discounting away the consequences.
To summarize, there is an underlying generic problem with CBAs or IAMs of climate
change that is not present in other, more standard, applications of economic analysis. In
rare situations with e⁄ectively unlimited downside liability, like climate change, CBAs or
IAMs can be extraordinarily sensitive to speci￿cations of extreme tail events. Conventional
CBAs or IAMs of climate change ignore this basic message at their own peril.
Needless to say, a very large number of caveats apply to the toy model of this paper.
The main omission is the lack of realistic dynamics in the model. For simplicity, the
toy model of this paper essentially analyzes and compares steady states, with only the most
primitive cause-and-e⁄ect dynamics. I think that this simpli￿cation allows some transparent
insights that can get obscured by much more complicated dynamic models, but it comes at
a price by omitting nuanced considerations of growth, discounting, how long it takes to
approach a steady state, and so forth. A drawback of my toy model approach is that
I could be missing some critical dynamic interactions that are unable to be captured by
the crudeness of such a simplistic comparative-steady-state formulation. So conclusions of
this paper are at most suggestive and may need to be modi￿ed in the light of performing
23numerical simulations from much more complicated dynamic computer models.19
That having been said, the suggestive comparative-steady-state numerical outcomes of
this toy model seem to me as if they might be su¢ ciently powerful that an appropriately
mu› ed version would likely survive a fully dynamic treatment. Remember, throughout
this paper the default fatness that really matters concerns the bad tail of the reduced-
form PDF of the log of ￿diswelfare￿(which includes damages). Nobody knows the tail
fatness of the PDF of the log of diswelfare ￿which is the very feature driving the lack
of robustness to speci￿cations of climate extremes. As a consequence, I somehow doubt
very much that robustness will miraculously be restored by introducing more sophisticated
dynamics. Actually, the various ￿stress tests￿ of this paper do not strike me as being
particularly ￿stressful￿at all. Therefore, I suspect rather strongly that it may be di¢ cult
to dislodge altogether the verdict that a CBA of climate change is terribly sensitive to
assumptions about extreme tail events ￿and that the primary reason for keeping GHG
levels down is mainly to insure against high-temperature catastrophic climate damages.
6 Conclusion
If a particular type of idiosyncratic uncertainty a⁄ects only one small part of an individual￿ s
or a society￿ s overall portfolio of assets, exposure is naturally limited to that speci￿c com-
ponent and bad-tail fatness is not such a paramount concern. However, some very few but
very important real-world situations have potentially unlimited exposure due to structural
uncertainty about their potentially open-ended catastrophic reach. Climate change poten-
tially a⁄ects the whole worldwide portfolio of utility by threatening to drive all of planetary
welfare to disastrously low levels in the most extreme scenarios. The comparative-steady-
state toy model of this paper suggests that the results of climate change CBA can sometimes
depend non-robustly on seemingly casual decisions about functional forms and parameter
values associated with extreme tails. The ￿ndings of this paper may be a warning that the
results of climate change CBA can be largely driven by the ￿fear factor￿associated with
low-probability high-impact catastrophes, which is di¢ cult to model robustly.
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